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1. Introduction
The growth of campaign spending over the past decade has attracted consider
able attention. Recent studies have analyzed the impact of contributions on
legislative vote patterns and the effects of campaign spending on election out
comes,I This paper views political contributions as one form of voting and
attempts to further our understanding of the determinants of individual deci
sions to contribute to political candidates.
Our information on individual political contributions is obtained from a new
data set on individual income tax returns. Prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1986,
and as early as 1971, the Internal Revenue Code allowed a dollar-for-dollar tax
credit for contributions to political candidates and political groups. The ceiling
on this credit was'$50 for single filers and $100 for married filers. The fact that
the price of giving is effectively zero implies that an individual's choice to
contribute and take the tax credit is a '~vote" in the political process. 2 We
examine the relations between these political contributions, or "votes," and
wealth, age, income tax rates and other relevant variables.
OUf examination of political contributions provides empirical input into
the voting-model literature. While most previous research examines political
contributions and votes at highly aggregated levels (e.g., municipal, con
gressional, gubernatorial or presidential seats), our paper examines political
contributions at the level of the individual. An advantage of examining indi
viduals is that the study suggests which factors dominate an individual's
decision to contribute and vote and therefore should be included in voting
model examinations of the relation between contributions, votes and outcomes
of elections.
*The views presented are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the Trea
sury Department.

2. Political contributions: Data sources and testing specification
Prior to 1987, the U.S. individual income tax allowed a dollar-for-dollar tax
credit for contributions up to $50 for single and $100 for joint filers. Since the
price is effectively zero, the decision regarding usage of tax credits is similar
to the decision regarding voting. In both cases, the costs are similar and involve
mainly time and information costs. In the case of voting, one must learn of
the upcoming election, be registered and go to the poll. In the case of tax
credits, one must pick his candidate(s), fill in the appropriate form, mail the
check and then claim the credit on a tax return. The benefits of political contri
butions display characteristics similar to voting as well. The benefits to voting
may be one's alignment with politicians of similar ideologies and with govern
ment policies that protect or enhance voters' wealth. Because tax credits convey
benefits similar to voting, taking advantage of tax credits should yield similar
benefits.
Our data on political credits are obtained from individual income tax re
turns, Form 1040. The data allow us to determine whether or not an individual
opted for the tax credit, and, hence, has contributed to political candidates.
Unfortunately, we cannot determine characteristics of fund-recipients; i.e.,
party affiliation or level of office (municipal, congressional, etc.) or the actual
size of contributions when they exceed the tax credit ceiling. These issues,
however, should not pose problems to our empirical work since we are not
concerned with modeling the effects of these contributions on elections out
comes and political behavior. Rather, we are concerned with determining why
taxpayers "vote" via contributions.
While individual tax returns contain information on income sources and can
be used in deriving marginal tax rates, they are lacking in data on demographics
and wealth. Therefore, we resort to a new data source that combines income
and estate tax returns. This data set is based on a sample of estate tax returns
of decedents in 1982 filed during 1982 and 1983. These estate tax returns were
matched against the income tax returns for 1981. The match was successful for
6,212 tax returns. We eliminate divorced and separated inviduals in order to
simplify our task of controlling for the influence of demography. This reduces
the number of observations to 5,180 individuals with net worth ranging from
$25,000 to well over half a billion. 3
We suggest the following testing specification of individual choice regarding
political contributions: 4
PC

=

f(AGE, WEALTH, MARRIED, TAX RATE, REGION)

where, PC

=

1 if political contribution are made; 0 otherwise

(1)

Table 1. Logit regression results'"
(Dependent variable = 1 if individual makes a contribution)
CONSTANT
In(AGE)
[In(AGE)]2
In(WEALTH)
MARRIED
TAX RATE
DUMMY NORTHEAST
DUMMY MIDWEST
DUMMY WEST
Log of likelihood
Sample size
Number with contributions

-33.378
(12.107)
12.734
( 5.765)
-1.547
( 0.686)
0.254
( 0.049)
0.909
( 0.074)
3.293
( 0.245)
0.058
( 0.091)
0.187
( 0.088)
0.220
( 0.090)
-2872
5810
1341

"'Standard errors in parentheses.

AGE
WEALTH
MARRIED
TAX RATE
REGION

=

=
=

=

age of individual
net worth
1 if individual is married; 0 otherwise
marginal tax rate
regional dummies for the Northeast, Midwest, and West.

To evaluate the effects of the above right-hand-side variables on the odds of
contributing, we estimate a logit regression of (1). All of these variables are
directly available on the tax returns with the exception of the marginal tax rate
which is simulated. The simulation is performed by increasing the adjusted
gross income by $100 and simulating the change in tax liability through the
return.

3. Empirical findings

Table 1 exhibits the logit estimation of (1), with the odds of contributing as a
function of AGE, WEALTH, MARRIED, TAX RATE, and regional dum
mies. The results indicate that the odds of making political contributions rise

with age and suggest that increases in political awareness are greatest in the
early years of the life cycle. This suggests that the older the individual is, the
greater is his interest in the system and, therefore, is more likely to contribute
to political candidates. The sign of the coefficient of the squared log of age,
however, indicates that the odds of contributing rise with age but at a declining
rate.
The significant and positive coefficient for the log of WEALTH indicates
that the odds of contributing rises with net worth. This suggests that wealth is
an important determinant of an individual's interest in the political process.
The odds of contributing also rise with TAX RATE. Individuals in high mar
ginal tax brackets are more likely to contribute than those in lower tax brack
ets. This result suggests that, given governmental income redistribution poli
cies, individuals in high tax brackets face higher relative prices for government
goods and, therefore, face greater incentives to participate in the political
process via making political contributions. This result may also suggest that
individuals not only vote at the polls with their "pocketbooks," but also con
tribute to politicians accordingly.
As for the dummy variables, MARRIED exerts positive effects on the odds
of contributing. The signs on the coefficients of regional dummies suggest that
individuals from the West and Midwest are more likely to contribute than
individuals from the Northeast or the South.

4. Conclusion
Two implications from this research are noted. First, from a researcher's view
point, our research suggests the importance of age, wealth, tax rates, and
marital status as determinants of political contributions by top U.S. wealth
holders. Therefore, these factors should be included in aggregated models that
attempt to analyze the relations between such variables as voting, campaign
expenditures and the outcomes of elections. Second, from politicians' view
points, this research suggests that individual economic variables such as margi
nal tax rates and wealth are major determinants of individual decisions to con
tribute to politicians. Assuming that such contributions reflect "votes," this
research suggests the relative importance of focusing campaign promises on
economic variables - a strategy that "low tax" politicians like Ronald Reagan
and George Bush may keenly be aware of.

Notes
1. See Jacobson (1984, 1985), Mablin (1984), Becker (1983), Chappell (1982), and Kau et al.
(1982), Welch (1980, 1981), and Bental and Ben-Zion (1981).

2. See Jacobson (1976) for a discussion of public funds for politicians.
3. A list of the variables and summary statistics are available upon request.
4. Riker and Ordeshook (1968) and Stigler (1971) argue that voting is a function of individual
benefit-cost calculations. Many factors are candidates for inclusion into these calculations.
Kau and Rubin (1979) argue that ideology enters into the calculation since contributors may
support candidates with the greatest advocacy of their views about government policy. Others
suggest the importance of "closeness of the race" (Riker and Ordeshook, 1968) and the costs
of voter-information (Tollison, Crain and Paulter, 1975).
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